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  1Abstract 
The management of pay in Britain has changed substantially in recent years.  
The paper starts with a theoretical discussion of the extent to which 
individual employers can exercise discretion in the management of their 
employees’ pay.  It then examines the ways in which pay is used to secure 
productive effort.  An analysis of the influence of trade unions leads on to an 
examination of the diminishing influence of collective bargaining in British 
pay determination.  The implications of this are discussed for employer pay 
strategies, within and between firms, and internationally.  It concludes with 
the consequences of diminishing trade union influence for the distribution of 
pay. 
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  21. Introduction 
 
The management of pay is of fundamental importance to the 
conduct of industrial relations.  The employment relationship is 
formed around the payment of labour, and it is the most 
conspicuous focus of labour’s collective concern.  This chapter 
discusses the strategies adopted by employers in fixing pay in 
Britain.  These strategies have undergone fundamental changes in 
recent years as the influence of trade unions has diminished, and as 
competitive pressures have increased and become more 
international. But pay is also the price of labour, and as such is the 
subject to market forces encompassing far wider terrains than those 
of any single employer.  How far do these forces constrain the 
employer’s discretion?   
 
This chapter starts by looking at how much discretion individual 
employers have over pay. Because conventional economic theory 
implicitly denies that employers have any distinct role, we look at 
economic explanations for the substantial pay differences that are 
actually to be found between similar firms.  We then develop a 
richer explanation by drawing attention to the uses of pay manifest 
in the differing ways in which employers try to secure productive 
effort from their workforces. For much of the last century their 
discretion was greatly modified by trade unions. But in recent 
years the consequent institutions of collective bargaining have seen 
substantial decline and change. We discuss the implications of this 
for employer pay strategies, and also the ways in which these 
strategies are increasingly transcending national frontiers. The 
chapter concludes with discussion of the implications of 




  32. The Dispersion of Pay 
 
A fundamental question when considering how much discretion 
employers have over their employees’ pay is why it is, in practice, 
that workers who are performing similar jobs for different 
employers in the same labour market are typically paid at different 
rates.  The starting point for the orthodox economic analysis of pay 
is the work of Hicks (1932) in his application of marginalist 
economic theory to the labour market.  Wages, he argued, are 
determined by the interaction of the forces of labour supply and 
labour demand in a competitive labour market with the result that, 
at the equilibrium wage for particular occupational group, no firm 
will wish to hire any more workers. Moreover, because the 
equilibrium wage is assumed to be equivalent to the contribution to 
revenue of the last (or marginal) worker employed in each firm, the 
competitive process by which such a wage is determined serves 
also to secure an efficient allocation of labour between different 
firms.  Consequently, within a given labour market, wage 
differentials between firms for a given type of labour will not be 
sustainable for long.  Any firm paying above the competitive wage 
will make a loss and will eventually be driven out of business.  
Any firm paying below the competitive wage will find itself unable 
to recruit and retain its workforce. 
 
An important departure from this competitive model of wage 
determination arises from the effect of trade unions. Hicks 
portrayed unions as monopoly suppliers of labour able to raise 
wages above the competitive level.  In an otherwise competitive 
economy the consequence of unions’ effect on wage levels will be 
that employment will contract in the unionized sector, and the 
displaced workers will eventually find employment in non-union 
firms which will lower their wage offers in the face of excess 
labour supply.  There is the implication that, in aggregate, output 
and income will fall because the allocative efficiency of the 
competitive labour market has been impaired.  But introducing the 
  4effects of unionism does not, by itself, assist an explanation of 
inter-employer wage differences. 
 
The question of inter-firm wage dispersion is important because, 
contrary to the expectations implied by the competitive model of 
wage determination, empirical studies have repeatedly found that 
this pay dispersion is substantial and sustained. Within the same 
local labour market – that is, where there are no spatial barriers to 
labour mobility – it is normal to find a range of earnings across 
firms for workers in similar occupational categories at a given 
point in time.  The magnitude of these inter-plant pay differentials 
is substantial. Similarly substantial pay dispersion is apparent in 
different economies, despite their having very different wage 
fixing institutions. A comparison of the labour markets of Chicago, 
Coventry and Adelaide found the inter-plant coefficient of 
variation of standard earnings of, for example, fork-lift truck 
drivers to be, respectively, 15, 13 and 11 percent (Brown et al. 
1980). 
 
Additional evidence of the distinctive role played by the firm in 
pay determination comes from studies, not of pay levels, but of pay 
changes.  The pay rises achieved by individual workers in a given 
year in the same labour market are commonly more in line with 
pay rises received by other occupations within the same firm than 
with those received by other individuals in the same occupation in 
other firms (Nolan and Brown, 1983). In this British study of 
highly unionised workers, their pay rises appeared to be 
determined more by the competitive circumstances confronting 
their employers in their product market than by those confronting 
them as individuals in their local occupational labour market. 
Evidence from a more industrially diverse Australian sample 
suggested that this dominance of the firm-specific effects was a 
feature of manufacturing industry rather than of industries with 
more fluid labour markets such as building or retailing.  Within 
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monopolistic industries (Brown et al. 1984). 
 
Another firm-related finding that has eluded straight-forward 
market-related explanation is the consistent relationship between 
firm size and pay levels.  There is evidence from several countries 
that the average earnings of workers in particular occupation 
categories tend to increase with the size of establishment and, in 
the case of multi-plant enterprises, with the size of the parent 
company (Weiss and Landau 1984; Thomson and Sanjines 1990).  
The sources of these size effects are likely to be connected with 
other size-dependent aspects of labour management (Marginson 
1984). Findings of this sort led the authors of the early American 
studies to question the competitive model of wage determination.  
Lester (1952) concluded that wage setting in local labour markets 
was characterized by a substantial ‘range of indeterminacy’ within 
which employers could select a stable point consistent with their 
chosen style of labour management, largely untroubled by short-
term fluctuations in the labour market.  This range of 
indeterminacy has been estimated to be of the order of 20 per cent 
of average earnings in one British study (Blanchflower et al. 
1990). 
 
Evidence on inter-firm wage dispersion draws attention to the 
extent to which employers may deliberately seek to shelter their 
workforces from the effects of the external labour market.  An 
example is the creation of so-called ‘internal labour market’ 
structures.  These are coherent wage and career structures internal 
to the firm by means of which employers use organizational rather 
than market relationships to motivate labour.  They are 
characterized by ports of entry at lower job grades, by on-the-job 
training, by internal promotion, and by seniority systems in which 
pay and job security are related to length of service (Doeringer and 
Piore 1971). Later we shall consider how the circumstances of 
internal labour markets are changing. 
  63. Economic Explanations of Pay Dispersion 
 
Economists have responded to the challenge posed by the findings 
on pay dispersion with several different approaches (Groshen 
1991).  Three of these approaches remain within the orthodox 
framework of competitive equilibrium.  One approach suggests 
that labour may be ‘sorted by ability’ so that differences in 
earnings reflect different productive capacities of workers, either 
innate or acquired.  But while such considerations may account for 
earnings differentials between individual workers, they do not 
thereby explain differences between firms. Even controlling for the 
fact that different firms may employ workers with different 
productive capacities leaves an important element of the inter-firm 
wage differential unexplained (Abowd et al. 1999).  Another 
approach seeks to explain wage dispersion by the absence of 
perfect information to workers about job opportunities so that their 
job search is costly.  Hence workers may take a job at a wage rate 
less than that prevailing elsewhere, thereby giving rise to a range 
of wages for similar jobs at any one time.  But, again, random 
variations in search behaviour or wage offers cannot account for 
the persistence of inter-firm pay differentials. 
 
An approach that does imply firm-specific effects is that there may 
be ‘compensating differentials’ of non-wage factors.  It starts with 
the observation that the wages that are paid do not fully reflect 
employees’ net compensation because they leave out a range of 
other factors that affect the return to employment.  Positive factors 
include such things as fringe benefits and good working 
conditions, whereas negative factors cover dirty or dangerous 
working conditions and unsociable hours.  This theory suggests 
that, once these compensating differentials have been taken into 
account, returns to employment should be similar across all firms 
in the labour market.  Unfortunately for the theory, however, 
evidence from a variety of studies finds that wages tend to be 
positively, not negatively, correlated with the provision of fringe 
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Freeman, 1989).  Firms that pay relatively well also tend to 
provide relatively good non-pay conditions. 
 
These approaches to pay dispersion do not explain why particular 
employers might choose to pitch their wage offers higher or lower 
in the range of indeterminacy than others.  They are cast as passive 
recipients of labour market conditions.  This weakness is addressed 
by three approaches that have attracted considerable attention in 
recent years: ‘monopsony’ models,‘insider-outsider’ models and 
‘efficiency wage’ models.  
 
Monopsony models of the labour market address the question of 
how some firms are able to pay at levels below the competitive rate 
without losing their workforce to competitors. In the simplest case 
this arises where a single employer is a monopoly purchaser of  a 
given type of labour within a local labour market. Workers find it 
costly to go elsewhere to find work, hence the employer is able to 
exercise ‘monopsony’ power in the labour market, and to pay less 
than the competitive rate. Even if firms are unable to attract 
sufficient numbers of workers at such rates of pay, they may 
nonetheless choose to operate with a permanent stock of vacancies 
because this represents a lower cost option than that of raising the 
pay rate to attract additional workers. One important implication is 
that a statutory minimum wage may actually result in an increase 
in employment, because it forces monopsony employers to raise 
their wage rates and thereby fill existing vacancies (Card and 
Krueger 1995; Stewart 2001). Further work has underlined the 
extent to which many labour markets could be subject to ‘dynamic 
monopsony’ (Card and Krueger 1995), because of the difficulties 
workers face in gaining accurate information about alternative jobs 
and the costs incurred in leaving one job and starting another.  
  8The central presupposition of ‘insider-outsider’ models is that 
firms enjoy a degree of product market power, and hence possess 
the ability to extract an economic rent from consumers over and 
above the costs of producing goods and services.  Workers can 
obtain a share of this rent if they are able to deploy bargaining 
power.  Such power is said to derive either from the possession of 
firm-specific skills (which are therefore costly for the firm to 
replace) or from union organization (which enables workers to 
exercise monopoly power over the supply of labour).  Wages are 
consequently determined by two sets of influences: ‘outsider’ 
reflecting the interaction of supply and demand in the labour 
market, and ‘insider’, reflecting the relative bargaining power of 
the employer and workers within the firm.  Providing the forces 
shaping the ‘insider’ influences can be shown to be firm-specific, 
then an explanation can be developed of the employer effect on 
wages (Lindbeck and Snower 1986; Carruth and Oswald 1989). 
 
Empirical evidence provides some support for ‘insider-outsider’ 
models expressed in terms of worker bargaining power.  Analysis 
of the 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (Blanchflower 
et al, 1990), for example, found, first, that the presence of a pre-
entry closed shop is associated with relatively high manual 
earnings and, second, that the ability of skilled workers to extract a 
rent appears to be less dependent on trade union organization than 
is the case for  semi-skilled or unskilled workers.  But how far the 
sources of ‘insider’ bargaining power might depend upon union 
organization rather than upon employer circumstances was 
questioned by Stewart (1990).  He was able to demonstrate that, 
providing firms possess a degree of product market power, semi-
skilled workers in non-union plants are as likely to benefit from a 
wage mark-up above competitive levels as their counterparts in 
unionized plants. 
 
This suggests that it may be fruitful to consider Slichter’s notion of 
the firm’s ‘ability to pay’ (Slichter, 1950).  According to this, those 
  9firms that possess a degree of product market power are more 
likely to pay above competitive wage levels because of their 
‘super-normal’ profits.  Given the usual economic assumption of 
profit maximization, however, conventional theory does not 
explain why employers should choose to pay over the competitive 
rate, unless coerced by union pressure.  The sixth approach offers 
an explanation. 
 
‘Efficiency wage’ theories share the central proposition that 
workers’ productivity will, in part, be determined by the level of 
wages (Akerlof, 1984; Akerlof and Yellen, 1986).  The payment of 
a wage in excess of competitive levels can, by eliciting extra 
productivity from workers, result in increments to output from 
which the revenue offsets the extra wage costs incurred.  From this 
perspective, pay is an important element in securing productive 
efficiency – that is, the maximization of outputs from labour effort 
– as distinct from allocative efficiency.  Various sources of this 
increased productivity have been suggested.  They include the 
coercive pressure on workers who would face an increased cost of 
job loss where their jobs are paid above market levels; the 
motivational effects stemming from greater worker commitment to 
high-paying employers; the savings in direct supervision costs 
associated with increased trust between employer and employee; 
and the savings associated with reduced labour turnover. 
 
The pay-off between higher pay and increased productivity that is 
implied by efficiency wage theories suggests that a competitive 
market might tolerate a spread of inter-firm differences in pay 
levels as a result of either deliberate or random choices by 
employers.  Empirical tests of efficiency wage theory are so far 
inconclusive (Groshen 1991).  They will remain so until the factors 
underlying the decisions of employers to position themselves 
differently in terms of the pay-productivity pay-off can be 
specified more clearly.  Despite this, there is considerable value in 
the central proposition that pay should be seen to play a part not 
  10only as a market price for labour, but also as a means by which 
managements can elicit productive effort from their workforce.  
 
 
4. The Employer’s Role in Pay Determination 
  
The discussion so far has described how economists’ conceptions 
of pay have shifted, somewhat uncertainly, to focus increasingly 
on the distinctive role played by the firm as the employer of 
labour.  Starting from the undeniable fact of substantial inter-firm 
pay dispersion, so unsatisfactory for an orthodox labour market 
theory, attention has moved to consider the pay-fixing behaviour of 
firms when they possess a degree of product market power, when 
they bargain with trade unions, and when they can use pay to elicit 
productivity (Rubery, 1997). This admission that the employer 
may have a distinctive role in pay determination is, however, only 
a starting point.  Before discussing the many aspects of the role it 
is necessary to establish four important empirical points about the 
competitive constraints under which labour is managed and paid.  
The first is that, in a world of imperfect competition, the influences 
of the product market are in contest with those of the labour market 
in determining pay, and employers have to mediate between them.  
Second, the degree of discretion offered to an employer by product 
market conditions is permissive and not imperative.  The third 
point is that a firm’s choice of pay and employment strategy is 
constrained by its broader production strategy.  Finally, within a 
firm’s employment strategy, it is misleading to isolate pay from 
other complementary instruments of motivation and control. 
 
The first point concerns the tensions that arise between the 
allocative and the productive properties of pay.  So long as 
employers have to recruit and retain labour they cannot wholly free 
themselves from the influences of the external labour market.  If 
pay for a particular skill falls too far out of line with the external 
market, labour turnover may rise.  But, in the context of an internal 
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effects on established differentials with other groups in the firm’s 
workforce. While such disruption may have costly consequences in 
terms of morale or strike action, it may be prohibitively expensive 
to solve the problem by conceding a uniform pay rise for all 
groups.  This was, for example, a common issue in highly 
unionised petrochemical refineries where traditional notions of 
internal equity dictated that all time-served craftsmen should be 
paid on the same rate even though the earnings of their various 
trades in the outside labour market might be very different. In 
recent years, however, the decline of traditional apprenticeship, the 
weakening of trade unions and recourse to outsourcing has 
provided employers with greater discretion. It is now common-
place to find once privileged groups, such as delivery drivers in the 
newspaper industry, being paid what are typically termed ‘market 
rates’, much inferior to their traditional rates, and comparable with 
those of the world outside. 
 
The second important point about employer discretion is that it is 
not mechanically moulded by product market circumstances.  The 
influence of the product market over wages tends to be coercive 
downwards, but permissive upwards. An employer’s monopoly 
strength is thus not necessarily reflected in relatively high wages.  
American studies have shown how companies in strong market 
positions have often been able to resist conceding high wages over 
long periods because, for example, the relatively few employers in 
the product market have found it relatively easy to combine to 
resist union demands (Levinson 1966; Ozanne 1968). Similarly, if 
an employer’s monopoly strength is reflected in relatively high 
wages, one should not conclude that this is necessarily the result of 
a deliberate employer strategy.  A study of British engineering 
firms demonstrated that some of them paid relatively high wages 
over periods of many years simply because their piece-work 
payment systems were hopelessly out of management’s control.   
Their product markets were undemanding, with the consequence 
  12that their managements had never been forced to undertake the 
difficult and potentially very costly task of regaining control 
(Brown, 1973).   
 
The third point is that a firm’s policy on employment and pay will 
be influenced by broader strategic choices.  The management of a 
firm is a complex, skilled activity.  Variations in productivity and 
labour performance are not simply reducible to differences in 
factor inputs (Clark 1980; Hodgson 1982). Even firms in direct 
competition with each other may adopt very different approaches 
to production and to labour control.  Firms whose production is 
based on high value added, where competition tends to be quality-
based, are likely to emphasize high standards of work 
performance, an ability to work with discretion, and low labour 
turn-over.  This, in turn, is likely to be reflected in levels of pay 
that are high relative to those prevailing locally because of the 
potential costs of employee disaffection (Ramaswamy and 
Rowthorn 1991).  This will contrast with firms whose competitive 
strategy is based on the production of low value added, 
standardized goods where competition tends to be cost- rather than 
quality-based.  It will contrast again with firms whose production 
is relatively capital intensive, which will tend to provide relatively 
good terms of employment, including pay, in order to ensure 
uninterrupted production. 
 
Fourth and finally, pay is usually used not as an isolated device, 
but as part of a package of complementary devices to elicit worker 
productivity.  A central source of such differences in productivity 
lies in the variable nature of the output of labour.  Labour cannot 
simply be hired and blithely set to work.  In practice, managements 
have to devise an integrated bundle of coercive and motivational 
devices to elicit productive effort from the workers they have 
hired.  Pay is usually an important component of this, but to 
varying extents.  Its importance is likely to be greater where, for 
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there is, for example, a strong vocational element. 
 
In sum, a combination of factors prevents employers from being 
simply the passive recipients of pay rates from the labour market.  
Employers differ in the compromises they make in protecting 
internal wage structures from the external labour market.  They 
operate in product markets that offer them different degrees of 
discretion, and they respond to that discretion in different ways.  
They adopt different competitive strategies in their productive 
markets.  They use pay to different extents and in different ways in 
trying to win productivity from their workforces.  The key to 
understanding the dispersion of pay between firms thus lies in 
investigating management’s active use of pay as a means of 
securing productive effort.  We address this by first looking at the 
management of payment systems and structures, before moving on 
to discuss the much wider issues involved in pay bargaining with 
trade unions. 
 
5. Managing Pay as a Motivator 
 
Payment systems are sets of rules with which employers link pay 
rates not only to job descriptions, but also to any of a great variety 
of indicators related to issues such as employees’ competence, 
performance, and career expectations.  For as long as there has 
been employment, payments systems have been the object of 
endless experimentation.  Why is the choice and management of 
payment systems intrinsically difficult, and why is pay so fickle a 
motivator? 
 
A recurrent theme in the literature on pay is the stability of relative 
pay levels over prolonged period of time (Phelps Brown and 
Hopkins 1981).  Authors who have been actively involved in the 
bargaining process have long commented on the dominance of 
custom in shaping conceptions of ‘fair’ relative pay levels, and 
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closely linked to social status and thereby to employee perceptions 
of self-esteem.  Consequently, for both employer and employee, 
one enters a motivational minefield when one strays from the 
pattern of relative pay that, whatever its origins may have been, 
has become consolidated by custom.  This is a major reason why 
relative pay levels generally respond sluggishly, if at all, to 
changes in the relative demand for different occupations in a 
labour market. 
 
If we look inside the firm, the stability of the pay structure 
becomes even more important.  Employees’ sensitivity to relative 
pay is all the more acute because they are in daily contact with the 
people in their comparative reference groups.  The closer the point 
of comparison, the closer it is watched.  Unless they accept that 
some rationale of ‘fairness’ underlies the disturbance of established 
internal pay differentials, employees are liable to become 
distressed, demotivated and thereby less productive. This applies 
whether or not trade unions are present, although their presence 
tends to precipitate a more robust reaction. 
 
It is, consequently, important for employers to avoid discordant 
disruptions of internal pay structures.  If there are managerial 
reasons to introduce alterations, it is important that it is done on 
some sort of basis of rational justification.  This is commonly done 
by means of a ‘job evaluation’ procedure.  Although these come in 
many types, they generally combine systematic job analysis with 
some degree of employee involvement in establishing acceptable 
relative pay levels.  Job evaluation generally incorporates a 
procedure to review alterations to job content so as to maintain the 
acceptability of the structure of relative pay under changing 
circumstances (Quaid, 1993). The maintenance of an acceptable 
internal pay structure is, in large part, a political exercise.  When 
correctly used, job evaluation provides a means of maintaining and 
legitimizing a negotiated order.  It provides a means for 
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pay, with implicit conceptions of fairness that are specific to the 
individual firm or bargaining unit.   
 
What makes the management of an internal pay structure so 
demanding is that external changes, in technological, 
organizational and in market circumstances, alter relative power 
relationships within the workforce. This, in turn, affects 
employees’ relative pay aspirations and their conceptions of 
fairness (Brown and Sisson 1975).  In brief, it is not simply that a 
stable internal pay structure is a precondition for a well-motivated 
workforce from management’s point of view, although that is a 
useful starting point.  The particularly demanding management 
skill is achieving an acceptable level of stability when changing 
circumstances alter what is acceptable. 
 
The danger that mismanaged pay will demotivate a workforce is all 
the greater when the payment system has some sort of performance 
related component.  Payment by results and performance related 
pay systems are notoriously fickle and often short-lived. They are 
difficult to monitor, often have dysfunctional side-effects, and can 
generate demotivating pay anomalies. There has been an increase 
in the use of performance related pay schemes in recent years, 
partly following declining trade union influence. Their success 
depends on the extent to which the main desired aspects of 
performance can be both measured and linked to pay in a way that 
the worker perceives to be fair. This is often very difficult in 
practice. But whether at the level of the individual worker or of the 
enterprise, incentive pay schemes usually remain a relatively 
minor, if highly sensitive, part of a wider motivational package. 
 
Important in understanding this paradoxically minor role that 
incentive payment schemes play in eliciting productivity is the fact 
that the main vehicle of long-term, sustained productivity growth is 
technological change. The introduction of an incentive scheme 
  16may achieve a step improvement in labour productivity. If it is 
successful it may even sustain productivity at that higher level for 
some time, but it cannot on its own continue to raise it. It is 
technological change that has brought the sustained and continuing 
improvements in labour productivity that we have witnessed in 
industrial societies over the past hundred or more years. Much 
(perhaps most) technological innovation affects labour productivity 
in an almost stealthy way through small improvements in 
materials, controls, organisation, and so on. This changes jobs 
piecemeal, incrementally and irregularly. Managers tend to cope 
with this by manipulating grading structures pragmatically, with 
fresh job grades being created and old ones being suppressed with 
the passage of time. 
 
Furthermore, this varied and elusive character of technological 
innovation means that there may be little association between the 
actual productivity improvement achieved and the worker’s 
perception of the increased difficulty and stress, if any, associated 
with it. The pay rises that accompany technologically driven 
innovation in practice owe much more to the scale of social and 
psychological disruption that the innovation has caused the 
workers involved, and to the consequent need to buy their consent. 
Consequently the size of ostensibly productivity related pay 
increases typically bears little relationship to any actual 
improvement in the productivity of the workers involved (Brown 
and Nolan 1988). 
 
In summary, pay plays a complex part in the productive use of 
labour and if not managed astutely can be a powerful demotivator.  
This is true whether or not workforces are organized in trade 
unions.  The presence of unions does, however, have a very 
distinctive impact on the management of pay.  Whether or not 
workers are unionized may not influence their sense of grievance 
when a sensitive pay differential is adversely and perversely 
altered, but it does affect their ability to take action over it.   
  17Managements deal with trade union action through collective 
bargaining, to which we now turn. 
 
6. The Restructuring of Collective Bargaining 
 
‘Collective bargaining’ is the term used when employers deal 
directly with the trade unions representing their employees in order 
to regulate the conduct and terms of their work.  The Webbs 
originally conceived of collective bargaining as an essentially 
economic activity in which workers substitute a group negotiation 
over wages for individual bargains.  Flanders (1975) argued that it 
was best seen as a political rather than an economic process, 
observing that the conclusion of a collective agreement does not 
bind anyone to buy or sell any labour.  It sets out the terms and 
conditions that will prevail if and when labour is engaged. He 
considered a more appropriate term for collective bargaining to be 
the joint regulation of work. Pay rates are only a part of the 
resulting web of rules, which usually also covers issues such as job 
descriptions, hours of work, and often, explicitly or by implication, 
working practices, disciplinary standards and effort levels.   
Collective bargaining is thus concerned with the joint governance 
not only of pay but also, to a greater or lesser degree, of many 
other important determinants of labour productivity. 
 
 
In Britain collective bargaining had, until the 1980s, enjoyed 
official support, with successive governments throughout the 
century upholding at least the principle of extending its coverage.   
Just what proportion of the workforce was covered by a collective 
agreement at any time has been less clear, with survey data only 
becoming available in the 1960s. Until the 1980s the percentage 
coverage of collective agreements was substantially greater than 
the percentage coverage of trade union membership, but this gap 
has narrowed substantially since the 1980s and, in aggregate terms, 
had vanished by 1998.  The first row of Table 1 provides data, 
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employees in Great Britain since 1960. These overstate bargaining 
coverage for the whole workforce because they relate to 
establishments of 25 or more employees, and smaller 
establishments have become increasingly less likely to be covered 
by any collective agreement. It will be evident that coverage 
declined dramatically after about 1980. 
 
 
What structure underlies this collective bargaining coverage?  A 
fundamental strategic issue for any employer intending to establish 
agreements with trade unions concerns the choice of bargaining 
unit, by which is meant the categories of employees that are to be 
covered by a particular collective agreement.  This has far-reaching 
managerial and economic implications because of the substantial 
standardization of wage rates and conditions of employment that is 
implied across all those employees included in a single bargaining 
unit. 
 
The most critical question facing employers is whether they should 
bargain as a united group, with an industry-wide agreement, or 
whether they should bargain independently, concluding 
agreements that are exclusive to some or all of their own 
employees.   The attraction of industry-wide bargaining 
arrangements comes from their potential to encompass whole 
product markets at regional or national level.   From the early days 
of collective bargaining both unions and employers have 
appreciated the chance this offers to pass on some of the cost of 
wage rises in price rises, traditionally referred to as ‘taking wages 
out of competition’.   For unions, industry-wide bargaining has the 
attraction of establishing the notion of the ‘rate for the job’ and of 
encouraging the identification of their members with their wider 
occupational and labour market collective interests beyond the 
individual firm.  It avoids some of the vulnerability of a workforce 
that bargains with its firm in isolation.   For employers, besides the 
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additional benefits that have strong productivity implications.     
These are, first, that industry-wide agreements tend to reduce the 
influence of the union within the workplace and thus limit union 
impact upon detailed job control.   Second, industry-wide 
agreements, with their accompanying standardization of job 
descriptions, make easier the industry-wide management of 
training which helps deal with the problem of ‘free-riding’ 
employers who do not train. 
 
Until the 1960s there were few open challenges to this argument in 
the British private sector.   Although there were some exceptions 
of companies that had their own ‘single-employer’ agreements, the 
overwhelming majority of employees were covered by industry-
wide (‘multi-employer’) agreements.  Elsewhere in Europe such 
agreements were to prove their resilience for many years to come, 
but in Britain post-war full employment was already placing them 
under excessive strain.   At workplace level across much of the 
private sector there was a growing if covert challenge reflected in 
the ‘wage drift’ of earnings away from the rates decreed by 
increasingly unrealistic industry-wide agreements.   Informal 
workplace bargaining was tending to sap management control over 
work.   In 1968 the Royal Commission under Lord Donovan, 
having pointed out the weakness of some of the larger industry-
wide agreements, argued that for many employers the best solution 
would be to break away into single-employer, or what is now 
commonly called ‘enterprise’, bargaining. 
 
This provided official blessing to an emerging trend that came to 
dominate British collective bargaining.   It is summarised with 
public and private sectors combined in the second and third rows 
of Table 1.  In the 1960s there was still a strong majority of 
employees who relied upon multi-employer (industry-wide) 
agreements.  By the end of the 1990s this had been reversed. Not 
only had coverage fallen substantially, but only about a third of 
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sector, because of centralised funding, multi-employer 
arrangements have continued to be important. But in the private 
sector the shift from multi-employer agreements was particularly 
marked; by 1998, the coverage of such agreements was one fifth 
that of enterprise bargaining. 
 
Why should there have been so widespread a move to enterprise 
bargaining when the arguments for industry-wide agreements once 
seemed so strong?  Employer solidarity has always had shallower 
roots in Britain than in most other European countries.   Britain has 
generally had weaker wage agreements and training arrangements 
and has had none of the employer association sanctions and strike 
insurance schemes that are often to be found elsewhere.  In any 
case, both the advantages and the feasibility of an agreement 
constrained by national frontiers diminish when international trade 
brings international product markets.   For an ever-increasing range 
of private sector goods and services, wages can no longer be ‘taken 
out of competition’ by an employer organisation based within a 
single country. Furthermore, the shift of much of the public sector 
into private ownership, out-sourcing, or decentralised trusts, 
agencies and the like has broken or weakened the national 
agreements that once regulated public employment. 
 
The positive reasons for adopting enterprise (‘single-employer’) 
bargaining come less from any benefits on the wages front than 
from the potential it offers employers to improve labour’s 
productivity in the light of their particular business circumstances.   
It allows employers to cultivate internal labour markets.   When 
much skill acquisition is on-the-job, and when technological 
change is constant and incremental, there are advantages in having 
fluid job titles, predictable career trajectories, and stable internal 
salary structures.   Enterprise bargaining fits in with the more 
individualistic treatment of employees that is associated with the 
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enterprise related incentive schemes.  
 
The changing structure within which bargaining is conducted in 
Britain is, however, the less dramatic feature of Table 1. More 
remarkably, the last row shows the rapid growth in the proportion 
of the workforce covered by no collective bargaining at all. If we 
take account of small workplaces not covered by the Table, it can 
be estimated that within a thirty year period the proportion of 
British employees unprotected by collective agreements of any sort 
rose from about a fifth to over two-thirds. The two developments 
are, however, linked. Employees working for many smaller 
employers previously covered by multi-employer agreements have 
de facto moved outside the collective bargaining system with the 
ending of those agreements, because of the absence of trade union 
organisation at their place of work. Furthermore, some larger 
employers have taken the opportunity provided by the move to 
single-employer bargaining to experiment with non-union, and 
therefore non-collective bargaining, arrangements when opening 
new sites (Marginson et al. 1993). What more precisely is the 
nature of this withdrawal from collective bargaining, and what is 
taking its place? 
 
 
7. Withdrawal from Collective Bargaining 
 
Until the 1980s it was almost unheard of for employers to 
withdraw from collective bargaining or, as it is usually termed, to 
‘derecognize’ trade unions.   It was common enough for unions to 
fail to win recruits in a workplace, or to succeed in that but to fail 
to gain recognition from management for bargaining purposes. 
And even then the employer not infrequently chose to follow the 
terms of the relevant multi-employer agreement. But once 
collective bargaining had become established it was generally felt 
not to be worth the effort and acrimony involved in unravelling 
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despite the government’s hostility to collective bargaining, acts of 
derecognition were rare and were generally confined to a narrow 
range of industries (Claydon 1989).   But by the end of the decade 
it was becoming more widespread, although in many cases 
negotiating rights were withdrawn not as a deliberate management 
strategy but through lack of support from employees (Millward et 
al. 1992), and this gathered pace until the prospect of a Labour 
government in the late 1990s.  
 
More important than derecognition in accounting for the retreat 
from collective bargaining was the fact that both new and existing 
employers opening ‘green-field’ sites became less willing to grant 
recognition (Millward et al 2000: 103-08).  The proportion of 
young workplaces with 25 or more employees (defined as those 
less than 10 years old) granting recognition to trade unions more 
than halved between 1980 and 1998, from six out of every ten to 
under three. By contrast, recognition rates amongst older 
workplaces (more than 10 years old) declined less markedly 
comparing 1998 with 1980 (Machin 2000: 634-35). Amongst large 
companies, a 1992 survey found that only a minority of those that 
currently recognised trade unions at some or all of their existing 
sites had granted unions recognition at new sites. Since decisions 
on union recognition were also reported to be highly centralised 
within the large companies concerned this implies a distinct shift in 
employer policy (Marginson et al. 1993).  
 
Even those employers still recognising trade unions for collective 
bargaining have seen a change in recognition in the form of a 
diminution of trade union influence and a consequent narrowing of 
the collective bargaining agenda. For a start, the association 
between recognition and trade union membership diminished. The 
density of trade union membership in workplaces with recognised 
unions fell from 78 per cent in 1980 to 56 per cent in 1998. 
Furthermore, within workplaces where unions were recognised for 
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by collective bargaining declined; from 86 per cent in 1984 to 67 
per cent in 1998 (Millward et al. 2000). But more important was 
the fact that the nature of recognition changed. The scope of 
bargaining - the range of issues affected by bargaining – 
diminished. By the late-1990s many workplaces with trade union 
recognition had ceased to have formal negotiations over pay, 
relying instead upon consultation with unions over the minor 
details of pay settlements within strict budgetary limits (Brown et 
al. 1998).  
 
The diminishing scope of recognition is even greater if we look at 
non-pay issues. WIRS surveyors concluded that ‘when we were 
able to compare the scope of bargaining between one survey and 
another the indications were that its scope had declined within the 
unionized sector. Broadly speaking, fewer issues were subject to 
joint regulation in 1990 than in 1980….’  (Millward et al. 1992:  
353). The 1998 WERS survey corroborates this picture. For 
example, where trade unions were recognised, the proportion of 
managers reporting that they negotiated over employee recruitment 
fell from 43 per cent in 1980 to 3 per cent in 1998 (Brown et al. 
2000). 
 
The arrival of a government in 1997 that was more sympathetic to 
trade unions, and the subsequent passing of the 1999 Employment 
Relations Act, has tended to reverse the trend towards complete 
withdrawal from collective bargaining, and even encourage 
‘rerecognition’ of unions in many firms. But this reversal appears 
to be very much on terms laid down by employers, and at the time 
of the writing it is unlikely to lead to substantial changes in pay 
fixing arrangements (Oxenbridge et al. 2001). 
 
How, then, was pay being fixed in Britain by the late 1990s?   
Table 2 draws on the 1998 WERS survey to categorise pay fixing 
arrangements by industrial sectors, showing the proportion of 
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that collective bargaining covered 61 per cent of the public sector 
workforce, but only 24 per cent of the private sector. Multi-
employer bargaining arrangements remain of significance only in 
the public sector (particularly local government, education and 
health). In the public sector too, statutory pay review bodies are 
important in determining pay, accounting for over one in five of 
employees. Where collective bargaining is on a single employer 
basis, in both the public and the private sectors it is evident that 
arrangements at higher levels of organisations covering a number 
of sites are more important, in terms of numbers of employees 
covered, than arrangements based on individual workplaces. In 
other words, centralised bargaining within organisations is more 
prevalent than decentralised site-by-site negotiations.  
 
For 50 per cent of all employees, and 66 per cent of the private 
sector, management fixed pay unilaterally. In the absence of 
collective bargaining it appears that relatively more employees are 
covered by decentralised than centralised pay setting arrangements 
within organisations. Even so, 30 per cent of all private sector 
employees have their pay unilaterally set centrally within the 
organisation (management at a higher level) as compared with 36 
per cent whose pay is unilaterally set by management at the 
workplace. Strikingly, despite the considerable rhetoric and 
attention devoted to the individualisation of the employment 
relationship, negotiation of pay with individual employees was a 
rarity, accounting for less than 5 per cent of employees in the 
private sector.  
 
The reality for the vast majority of employees who work in the 
private sector in Britain is that management, not trade unions, now 
determine their pay. In 1998 only one in five workplaces in the 
private sector engaged in collective bargaining, whereas four in 
five had pay set unilaterally by management (Cully et al. 1999). 
No new institutional arrangement has emerged in the place of 
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jointly determine their pay with their employer. Personal contracts, 
in which individual employees negotiate their pay with 
management, are found in only a small minority of that large 
proportion of private sector workplaces where there is no 
collective bargaining (Cully et al. 1999). In practice, 
‘individualisation’ means that trade unions are procedurally 
excluded from fixing pay and conditions, not that employees each 
receive substantively non-standard, pay and conditions packages 
(Brown et al. 1998). The absence of any structure of employee 
representation in the great majority of non-union workplaces is 
reflected in the finding from a survey of the electrical engineering 
and insurance sectors, that non-union employee representatives 
were consulted by management when setting pay in just 5 per cent 
of cases (Cully and Marginson 1995). We now turn to how, in an 
era of diminished trade union influence, pay setting is managed 
and controlled. 
 
8. Management control and co-ordination of pay setting 
arrangements 
 
How are pay setting arrangements managed? There are two main 
dimensions to this: first, the control of pay within the firm and, 
second, how pay is positioned in relation to other employers. The 
question of internal control is especially important in large multi-
site, multi-divisional firms. The growing fragmentation of pay 
setting arrangements in the private sector since 1980 has 
increasingly been offset in multi-site organisations by substantial 
co-ordination or control of local pay determination by management 
at corporate and divisional offices. A study of large companies 
operating in the UK in 1992 found that half conducted pay 
negotiations at site level in at least part of the enterprise. Yet two-
thirds of these reported that higher, corporate management were 
involved in local level negotiations, either directly participating or, 
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managers had to negotiate (Marginson et al. 1993).  
Even where local management within large organisations appears 
to enjoy autonomy over pay setting, it usually has to operate within 
a corporate framework of budgetary control. The same survey of 
large UK companies found that the corporate finance function was 
extensively involved in setting and negotiating the payroll budgets 
that shape pay settlements. Moreover, when asked about the 
assumptions on pay, productivity and employment on which 
payroll budgets are based, corporate finance managers in over one-
half of these large companies were able to give precise estimates of 
the assumptions employed (Marginson et al. 1993). Local 
managers engaged in decentralised pay setting probably have 
discretion over the trade-off between pay, productivity and 
headcount within their part of the business, but the budgetary 
constraints of the trade-off are either set by or negotiated with 
corporate headquarters.  
 
Controlling pay within the firm is one matter; positioning pay 
levels and pay increases competitively with regard to other firms is 
quite another, especially in the absence of the sectoral agreements 
which once provided at least a common reference point for pay. An 
initial expectation would be one of greatly increased diversity in 
pay and in pay settlement levels, since the rationale of 
decentralised pay setting at enterprise level is to tie pay more 
closely the particular business requirements. To some extent this 
appears to have been fulfilled. A study of pay settlements that the 
CBI monitored over the period 1980 to 1994 suggested that 
dispersion did increase after 1990. But annual settlements 
remained the norm, and the use, and apparent impact, of 
comparisons with other firms remained significant and strong in 
the 1990s, although now driven less by union pressures than by 
employer ‘bench-marking’ (Ingram et al. 1999).  
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bargaining arrangements have ceased to operate (engineering and 
retail distribution) with two sectors where national agreements 
over pay remain in force (printing and the health service), finding 
there to be still a recognizable annual pay round and no significant 
difference in variation in average pay between, for example 
engineering and printing (Arrowsmith and Sisson 1999). In other 
words, a sector effect on pay setting lived on in the sectors that had 
abolished national bargaining arrangements. In part this ‘convoy’ 
effect arises from the similar nature of product markets, labour 
requirements and technology within sectors. But it also reflected 
the durability of established ways of doing things; the shadow of 
the respective national agreements was clearly evident in the 
payments systems and job structures found amongst firms in the 
engineering and retail sectors. 
 
Information on other employers’ pay levels and movements 
becomes particularly important in a context of decentralised pay 
setting in providing an alternative set of benchmarks for 
management (Arrowsmith and Sisson 1999). In a survey of pay 
determination arrangements in electrical engineering and 
insurance, Cully and Marginson (1995) found that four out of 
every five workplaces used information on other employers’ levels 
of pay. The most common means were national salary surveys, 
employers’ association reports and other industry-specific salary 
surveys. A majority of workplaces also participated in local salary 
surveys. Beyond such surveys firms also participate in industry and 
local networks, and in informal discussion with other companies. 
Decentralised pay setting appears to have encouraged these 
information and networking arrangements.  
 
  289. Pay determination in the face of growing European 
economic integration 
 
Given increasingly international product markets, and given the 
transnational character of the operations of many large companies 
in Britain, are employers beginning to set their pay levels by 
reference to what employers in other countries are doing? Within 
the European Economic Area, are there signs that economic 
integration is stimulating particular European practices such as 
cross-border pay comparisons and pay structures? Are trade unions 
driving forward  developments as well as management?  
 
Pay determination arrangements are almost universally single-
employer based, either at company or site level, in the sectors 
where competition is most clearly international in scope and 
production is increasingly integrated across borders, such as 
chemicals, engineering, food manufacturing and banking and 
financial services. Amongst the multinational companies (MNCs) 
which dominate these sectors, the collection of data on labour-
related aspects of performance, including pay, productivity and 
labour costs, by MNCs’ international corporate or business 
headquarters is widespread. This is particularly the case for MNCs 
with integrated production systems or which network services 
across borders, and where personnel managers from operations in 
different countries are in frequent contact and regularly meet 
together (Marginson et al. 1995). Such data are deployed by 
international management in the form of inter-plant comparisons to 
exert pressure on local management and workforces to deliver 
performance- and flexibility-enhancing measures in local 
negotiations. This arises in a European, and sometimes global, 
context where sites are competing for production mandates and 
future investment from the MNC. However, such inter-plant 
comparisons appear to be primarily brought to bear in bargaining 
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less so on pay as such (Coller 1996; Mueller and Purcell 1992).  
 
Such international benchmarking of employee performance 
appears to be reasonably common in the engineering sector, but 
unusual in printing and rare in retail (Arrowsmith and Sisson 
2001). The latter two sectors are much less exposed to 
international competition than the first. In engineering, although 
international comparisons of pay were more widespread, they had 
relatively little influence on pay settlements amongst companies in 
the sector. Of considerably greater significance was the use by 
companies of international comparisons of overall labour costs. 
Arrowsmith and Sisson (2001) conclude that British employers 
appear to be engaged in two processes in managing pay in an 
international context. First, pay settlements (and employee 
expectations) themselves continue to be shaped by local and 
national considerations. Second, labour costs are then aligned with 
international benchmarks through parallel adjustments both to the 
numbers employed and to changes in working practices and 
working time arrangements, sometimes negotiated and other times 
not.  
 
An earlier study of British-based multinationals found that many 
were using common job evaluation systems for white-collar and 
managerial employees across Europe, indicating that there may be 
advantages in harmonising career and control structures within a 
company. But this is a quite separate matter from that of 
harmonising pay levels. The multinationals surveyed were acutely 
aware that differences in pension arrangements, taxation and social 
security represented a substantial impediment to any such 
harmonisation, differences that remain even after economic and 
monetary union (Walsh et al. 1995). Firms were generally hostile 
to the idea of European co-ordination of pay bargaining across 
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from trade unions. Five years later, managers interviewed in nine 
multinational companies operating in the UK largely echoed these 
views and concerns (Sisson et al. 1999). Intensified use of cross-
border comparisons in negotiations over working practices and 
working time were anticipated by managers, especially in the 
automotive sector, but movement towards common rates of pay in 
different European countries was seen to remain a ‘distant 
prospect’ for most types of employee. The exceptions were said to 
be mangers themselves and some groups of technical staff.   
 
Trade unions for their part are deploying cross-border comparisons 
of working time and working  practices in company and site 
negotiations amongst some of the more internationally integrated 
multinational companies. For example, this was evident in UK 
claims in the late 1990s for reduced working time at the major 
automotive manufacturers, where explicit comparisons were drawn 
with practice at company plants in other European countries 
(Sisson et al. 1999).  However, as on the management side, the use 
of international comparisons does not appear to have extended to 
negotiations over pay. British trade unions are involved in 
developing bargaining co-operation and the exchange of 
bargaining data and relevant information with their counterparts in 
other European countries (Sisson et al. 1999). But the UK is 
unlikely to be at the forefront of sustained moves by Europe’s 
trade unions to develop a cross-border dimension to pay bargaining 
across the European Economic Area. This is for two reasons. First, 
the UK remains outside the single currency, and national and local 
settlements are therefore unlikely to be particularly influenced by 
the greater wage transparency that the introduction of the Euro is 
bringing about. Second, is the difference between the sector-based, 
multi-employer bargaining structures which still prevail in most 
other EEA countries and the single-employer pay determination 
arrangements that now predominate in the UK. For trade unions, 
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a European dimension to pay bargaining must entail represents a 
substantial future challenge.  
 
10. Collective Bargaining and Wage Inequalities 
 
We now return to the issue of income distribution with which we 
started. What have been the consequences of diminishing trade 
union influence over pay? The contraction of collective bargaining 
in Britain has been accompanied by a marked growth in wage 
inequalities, reversing moves towards greater equality in the 
distribution of earnings that characterized the post-War period up 
to the late 1970s. Wage inequality rose dramatically in the 1980s 
with the result that by the end of the decade the gap in earnings 
between the highest and lowest paid male workers was greater than 
it had been over a century ago (Machin 1996; Johnson 1996). A 
growth in the spread of earnings has occurred at both the bottom 
and top of the wages distribution. Consequently, while those 
employees at the bottom decile of the earnings distribution have 
received relatively modest rises in real wages, those in the top 
decile have experienced dramatic increases in the level of their real 
earnings. The Low Pay Commission, for instance, estimated that 
real hourly wages for those employees in the bottom decile of the 
wages distribution had risen by 20 per cent since 1978 compared 
with 66 per cent for those in the top decile (LPC 1998:189).   
 
If unearned incomes are taken into account, including, for 
example, income from share options received in payment, the 
picture becomes even starker. The top 1 per cent of income 
recipients saw their share of total income in the UK, which had 
been falling steadily since the 1910s, double from about five per 
cent to about ten per cent between 1980 and 1998 (Atkinson 2001). 
It is consistent with the view that an important dynamic in the 
contemporary pay fixing system may be ‘top down’ pay pull 
whereby the interlocking membership of company directors’ pay 
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and self-reinforcing awards (McCarthy 1993).  
  
Many countries experienced growing earnings inequalities in the 
1980s and 90s. Apart from Britain and the United States, however, 
the increase in inequality was quite modest. Indeed, Machin’s 
(1999) analysis of trends in male wage inequality from the late 
1970s to the mid 1990s suggests that the dispersion of earnings 
widened dramatically in Britain and the US, but that the structure 
of wages in other countries, notably in continental Europe, 
remained relatively stable. While a variety of factors may underlie 
rising wage inequalities, the weakening of the collective 
institutions of pay determination appear to have been crucial in the 
British context. Wage bargaining serves to compress the structure 
of earnings for employees both within and across firms, 
occupations and industries. This is commonly referred to as the 
‘sword of justice’ effect of trade unions (Freeman and Medoff 
1984). The tendency of trade unions to encompass lower waged 
employees within the scope of collective agreements, as well as 
their efforts to tie pay rates to jobs rather than individual 
productivity or performance criteria, have typically led to a 
compression of the wages distribution. Accordingly, a range of 
studies have indicated that trade unions in Britain have, through 
collective bargaining, served to ‘equalise’ earnings (see Metcalf 
1982; Stewart 1987; 1991; Ingram 1991; Gosling and Machin 
1995). As a result, the earnings of unionised workers have been 
less dispersed than those of their non-unionised counterparts. 
Moreover, such effects have been buttressed by legislative 
mechanisms – such as the Fair Wages Resolution repealed in 1983 
- that have extended the terms of collective bargaining agreements 
to firms not directly involved in such agreements.  
 
This ‘equalising’ impact of trade unions has been undermined by 
falling membership and by the withdrawal by employers from 
collective bargaining. Studies have sought to measure the effect. 
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considerable widening of the gap in the spread of earnings across 
union and non-union plants between 1980 and 1990, estimating 
that around 15 per cent of the rise in the dispersion of semi-skilled 
earnings between 1980 and 1990 was attributable to the decline in 
unionisation (Gosling and Machin 1995). Machin’s analysis of the 
British Household Panel Survey from 1983 and 1991 attributed 
between 20 and 37 per cent of the rise in wage inequality to falling 
unionisation (Machin 1997). It also suggested that while wage 
inequality among individuals rose within both the union and the 
non-union sector, the spread of earnings increased at a faster rate in 
the non-union sector. The increase in the relative size of the non-
union sector over this period appears therefore to have been an 
important determinant of the overall rise in wage inequality.  
 
Such findings are consistent with the international evidence. In the 
context of the United States, Card (1991) and Freeman (1993) 
found that declining unionisation accounted for approximately one 
fifth of the rise in male wage inequality between the 1970s and 
1980s. For Australia, Borland (1996) found that the decrease in 
union density over the period 1986 to 1994 explained 
approximately 30 per cent of the increase in the dispersion of male 
weekly earnings and 15 per cent of the rise in female earnings 
dispersion. As in Britain, the main cause of the increase in wage 
inequality was a rise in the spread of earnings for non-union 
employees.  
 
All this suggests that the weakening of trade unions has had a 
substantial effect on the distribution of earnings. If we now turn to 
the bargaining structures within which trade unions operate, it 
appears that the decentralisation of wage determination has served 
to widen wage differentials. Rowthorn (1992) compared labour 
market performance in seventeen OECD countries between 1973 
and 1985 and concluded that countries with highly decentralised 
wage-setting arrangements have generally been associated with 
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Kahn’s (1996) analysis of international trends in male wage 
inequality. In accounting for the higher level of earnings dispersion 
in the US compared to other OECD countries, they emphasise the 
role of institutional forces, including the coverage of collective 
bargaining, union pay policies and government labour market 
policies, in determining international differences in wage 
inequality. The decline of collective bargaining and of trade unions 
has had profound consequences for the structure of pay and the 
depth of wage inequality.  
 
11. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter we have described the demise of the system of 
multi-employer bargaining over pay in Britain, a structure of pay 
setting which continues to prevail in many other west European 
countries, and its replacement by company-based systems for 
determining pay. We have also shown how, in a growing 
proportion of these company-based arrangements, pay is not 
determined through collective bargaining with trade unions but 
unilaterally by management. The influence of collective bargaining 
on pay has diminished considerably.  
 
Explanations of pay rooted in the efficient workings of the labour 
market, which tend to dominate accounts in economics texts, have 
been shown to be partial and incomplete. It was argued that the 
factors determining the level at which employers set their pay 
awards, and whether in large organisations pay is determined at the 
level of the wider group or individual site, are closely connected to 
management’s competitive strategy in the product market. 
Accordingly, any future ‘Europeanisation’ of pay setting is likely 
to arise from the further integration of product markets that 
economic and monetary union brings, and not through the 
imminent creation of a European labour market. 
 
  35Changes in the structure and coverage of collective bargaining, and 
declining trade union influence in wage setting, have permitted a 
marked increase in wage inequality in Britain since 1980. Statutory 
measures to support union recognition for collective bargaining, 
and the introduction of the National Minimum Wage, constitute 
important changes to the institutional landscape of pay 
determination in Britain. Whether their longer-term effects will 
serve to reverse the rise in wage inequality remains an open 
question.  



















  37Table 1 -  Employees covered by collective bargaining for pay fixing and 
principal level of pay bargaining: GB establishments of 25 or more 
employees, 1960-1998 
 
1960    1970    1980   1984   1990   1998 
 
collective     80%     80%    75%    70%    54%    40% 
bargaining 
of which 
industry level   
(multi-employer)             60%    50%    43%    37%     31%    14% 
 
enterprise level 
(single-employer)             20%   30%      32%     33%     23%      26%    
 
no collective        20%     20%    25%    30%    46%   60%  
bargaining 
 
Public and private sectors; estimates in italics. 
 
Sources : Beatson, 1993; Millward et al., 1992; Milner, 1995; Millward et al. 





















  38Table 2 - Coverage of different pay fixing arrangements, 
overall and by sector and industry (per cent of employees) 
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Notes: Data weighted, based to population of Great Britain, workplaces with 
10 or more employees. The first seven rows do not add up to 100 per cent 
due to rounding errors. 
Source: Brown et al., 2000, from WERS98 
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